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Notes
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF STATE TAX-
ATION OF INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The problem of the proper scope of the Constitutional doctrine
prohibiting the States from taxing instrumentalities of the Fed-
eral Government is one which has caused sharp legal debate
from the foundation of the United States. Chief Justice Mar-
shall attempted to settle it once and for all in his celebrated
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,1 which is a short treatise on
the general political theories he thought were involved, rather
than an opinion on the particular facts of the case. Yet, the
correct application of the principle is still being disputed and thejustices of the Supreme Court of the United States frequently
are unable to agree. In order to understand the present scope
and philosophic basis of the doctrine, it is necessary to appre-
ciate exactly how far the Courts have gone in the several distinct
fields to which it applies.
1 (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
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The simplest class of cases involving this principle is that of
taxes on property directly owned and used by the United States.
Congress apparently entertained some doubt as to the tax-ex-
empt status of such property, as it imposed conditions to protect
it in the Acts admitting many of the earlier states into the
Union. 2 After an exhaustive review of the authorities, the
Supreme Court held the first attempt to levy such a tax uncon-
stitutional in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee.3 This conclusion was
based on the fact that such property is obviously essential to the
exercise of the Federal functions and upon the twin Marshallian
dogmas that the Federal Government is supreme within its own
sphere and that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.4
Closely similar questions are involved in the consideration of
the validity of State taxation of lands which the United States
has allotted to its Indian wards. Here the land is obviously an
instrumentality of the Federal power in promoting the financial
and cultural progress of the Indian. In the typical instance the
Indian has only a very restricted power of alienation and has not
legal title to the land.5 A tax on the Indians with respect to
their interest in the land is void. 6 When the land is leased to
others for exploitation, the lessee is not subject to a tax on his
gross production of minerals,7 an income tax on his profits from
working the lease, 8 or even to a personal property tax on ore
already mined, but held in storage on the leased land. 9 How-
ever, in 1928 the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a lessee
of land bought by the Secretary of the Interior for an Indian out
2 The first such provision was in the Act authorizing the admission of
Louisiana in 1811 (2 Stat. 642), applying to lands alone. Similar provisions
were inserted in the Acts for the admission of Alabama (1814, 3 Stat. 492),
Arkansas (1836, 5 Stat. 51), and Michigan (1836, 5 Stat. 49). The more
common type protected both the lands and property of the United States,
as in the Missouri Act (1820, 3 Stat. 457). In a few cases there was no
such provision, as in the Maine Act (1820, 3 Stat. 544) and the Texas joint
resolution (1845, 9 Stat. 108). The independent validity of such provisions
is very doubtful in view of the decision in Coyle v. Smith (1911) 221 U. S.
559.
3 (1885) 117 U. S. 151.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, above.
5 Therefore a state inheritance tax upon land passing between Indians is
void. Childers v. Beaver (1926) 270 U. S. 555.
6 The Kansas Indians (1866) 5 Wall. 737.
7 Choctaw and Gulf R. R. v. Harrison (1914) 235 U. S. 292.
8 Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1921) 257 U. S. 501 (Pitney, Brandeis, and
Clarke dissented).
9 Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir (1926) 271 U. S. 609. McReynolds dis-
sented on the ground that the Federal instrumentality is only remotely af-
fected, while Brandeis dissented on the ground that property of a private
corporate agent of the U. S. had never before been held exempt.
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of the profits from his allotment lands was subject to the Okla-
homa gross-production tax, even though the Indian's power to
aliene this land was as restricted as his power over his allotment
lands. The Court speaking by Justice Stone said: "What
governmental instrumentalities will be held free from State
taxation, though Congress has not expressly so provided, cannot
be determined apart from the purpose and character of the legis-
lation creating them." The Court then found that an exemption
was not required, as the purpose of Congress in authorizing such
purchases was to train the Indians for citizenship.' 0 The test
used appears logically somewhat unsatisfactory since it makes
the purpose of Congress when the statute was passed rather
than the present function of the instrumentality the criterion of
its tax-exempt status. However, this does obviate the practical
difficulties which would arise if the tax status of existing instru-
mentalities would have to be determined anew each time it was
thought Congress had changed its views as to their function.
It is sometimes more convenient for the government to per-
form its functions through corporations chartered under Fed-
eral statutes, but wholly or partially privately owned and con-
trolled, than to do the work directly. The two banks of the
United States were the first instances of this practice. The
cases of McCulloch, v. Maryland" and Osborne v. The Bank12
determined that the only tax which a state could impose on such
a corporation was a tax upon its real estate, although the indi-
vidual shareholders could be taxed upon the value of their shares
of stock. When the National Banking System was founded,
Congress enacted Marshall's decisions into statute law by ex-
empting the National Banks from all state taxation with two ex-
ceptions. The shares could be taxed by the state wherein the
bank was located, but could not be assessed at a greater rate
than that paid by other "moneyed capital," and the real estate
of the bank was subject to taxation at the same rate as other real
property.13 In National Bank v. Commonwealth14 it was de-
cided that a state might require a national bank to pay the tax as
agent for its shareholders, provided it was allowed to reimburse
itself from them. However, the State must be careful not to
tax the bank itself on the value of its stock, the form rather than
the substance of the tax determining its validity. The greatest
difficulty has come in interpreting the provisions designed to
10 Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp. (1928) 276 U. S. 575; of. South
Carolina v. U. S. (1905) 199 U. S. 437, holding that the U. S. may tax non-
governmental instrumentalities of a state.
1 (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
12 (1824) 9 Wheat. 737.
= (1864) 13 Stat. 99, 110-112; (1868) 15 Stat. 34.
14 (1869) 9 Wall. 353.
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guard against discrimination by the states. "Moneyed capital"
has been held to mean "capital employed by individuals when
the object of their business is the making of profit by the use of
their moneyed capital as money . . . as in banking." 15 The essen-
tial element is competition with one or more phases of the busi-
ness of a national bank.16 However the law is not to be applied
with a rigid technicality and it does not render a state statute
invalid unless it exempts "large and substantial" amounts of
other moneyed capital.' 7 The mere fact that different modes of
assessment were used does not invalidate the law unless there
was actual discrimination. 18 In 1923 Congress amended the Na-
tional Banking Act by inserting a new provision forcing the
states to choose whether they would continue to tax the shares of
the banks as before, or include the dividends from the shares in
the income tax upon the holder, or levy a tax against the bank
on its net income. It was provided that these taxes should not
be discriminatory. The state's power to tax the bank's real
estate was not taken away.' 9 A second amendment in 1926 al-
lowed the imposition of a tax on the banks "according to or
measured by their net income." Under this clause "net income"
was defined to mean "net income from all sources" 20 and hence
reaches income whose non-taxable source would exempt it from
an ordinary state income tax. This tax does not prevent the
state including dividends from the bank in the stockholder's tax-
able income. Deposits in national banks are subject to state
personal property taxes and the bank may pay them as agent
for its depositors.2 1 This tendency towards permitting freer
state taxation of national banks is highly reasonable in view of
the lesser direct aid given the Federal Government by them since
the creation of the Federal Reserve System. Such legislation
avoids the dangers inherent in allowing changes in established
statutes by mere judicial action and yet allows all taxes which
the states might reasonably levy. The federal reserve banks,
which are much more closely connected with the functioning of
the Government than the national banks ever were, are totally
exempt from all forms of state taxation.22 The federal land
banks and federal intermediate credit banks are subject to state
15 Mercantile Bank v. New York (1887) 121 U. S. 138.
16 Aberdeen Bank v. Chehallis County (1896) 166 U. S. 440.
17 First National Bank of Garnett v. Ayers (1894) 160 U. S. 660.
is San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge (1904) 197 U. S. 70. There is
a thorough collection of all the cases on this subject in 12 U. S. C. A.
369-417.
is (1923) 42 Stat. 1499, 12 U. S. C. sec. 548.
20 (1926) 44 Stat. 223, 12 U. S. C. sec. 548.
21 Clement National Bank v. Vermont (1913) 231 U. S. 20.
22 (1913) 38 Stat. 258, 12 U. S. C. sec. 531.
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taxation upon their real estate alone, while their bonds, mort-
gages, and debentures are declared by Statute to be "instrumen-
talities of the Federal Government" and exempt from all state
taxes.23
Aside from banks, the Federal Government has chartered
relatively few corporations which operate within the United
States. Where the stock of these corporations is privately
owned, the property and income of the corporation may be taxed,
just as though it were state incorporated, but the state cannot
include the value of its franchise from the United States in such
property nor levy a franchise tax on the corporation's exercise
of its functions within the state. The tax on the property or in-
come of such instrumentalities (chiefly the Pacific railroads) is
considered "too remote" in its effect on their purpose to render
it invalid.24 Where the stock of the corporation is wholly owned
by the United States, the states cannot tax any of its property
or income, for the Supreme Court in taxation cases refuses to
pay attention to the corporate fiction and realistically treats the
property as if it were owned directly by the United States. 26 By
analogy the fact that a person is operating a business under a
Federal license does not exempt him or his property from tax-
ation,26 although the state cannot impose another license tax.2 7
Privately owned property being used to execute a contract
with the United States 28 or under control of the United States
through the exercise of the war powers (as the railroads under
the Federal Railroad Administration)29 is not thereby exempted
from state taxation. The same is true of property under control
of officers of the United States courts by virtue of receivership 3
or bankruptcy proceedings.31 However, the state cannot levy a
license tax upon the carrying on of an enterprise in fulfilment
23 (1916) 39 Stat. 380, 12 U. S. C. sec. 931; (1923) 42 Stat. 1459, 12
U. S. C. sec. 1111; Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1920) 255 U. S.
180; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland (1923) 261 U. S. 374.
24 Thomson v. Union Pacific Railroad (1869) 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v.
Peniston (1873) 18 Wall. 5; Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. California
(1895) 162 U. S. 91.
25 Clallam County v. U. S. (1923) 263 U. S. 341, but such companies are
not closely enough connected with the sovereignty of the U. S. to be exempt
from suit. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1921) 258
U. S. 249.
26 Thompson v. Kentucky (1908) 209 U. S. 340; Susquehanna Power Co.
v. State Tax Commission of Maryland (1931) 51 S. Ct. 434.
27 Moran v. New Orleans (1883) 112 U. S. 69.
28 Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore (1904) 195 U. S. 375.
29 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Middlekamp (1920) 256 U. S. 226.
so Stevens v. New York & 0. M. R. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) Fed. Cas.
13,405.
a' Swarts v. Hammer (1904) 194 U. S. 441.
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of a contract with the Federal Government,3 2 nor even impose a
tax upon articles sold to the United States.33
The Constitution of the United States directly authorizes the
Federal Government to grant patents and copyrights. 34 The
purpose of a patent is to encourage the publication of discoveries
by giving the inventor an exclusive right for a limited period to
produce the article as a reward for his labor.35 The Supreme
Court of the United States has likened it to a Federal franchise.
It is true that in this case (Long v. Rockwood,36 holding invalid
a state income tax including royalties from patents in taxable
income) Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Sutherland dis-
sented on the grounds that a patent was not a federal, instru-
mentality and that in any event a reasonable tax should be al-
lowed. Justice Holmes' view that patents and the like are merely
private privileges and not instrumentalities of the Federal
Government seems to overlook the fact that they are virtually
declared to be the latter by the reasons assigned in the United
States Constitution authorizing them. However, they are clearly
less closely connected with the governmental functioning than
many other of the means the government uses in achieving its
purposes, and the doctrine announced in Shaw v. Gibson-Zah-
niser Oil Corporation37 might have been applied so as to render
them subject to reasonable state taxes on the ground that the
purpose of Congress in creating them did not require their ex-
emption in the absence of express statutory provisions. Patents
or licenses under patents cannot be included in the valuation of
the property of their holder for the state general property tax.38
Stock issued by a corporation in return for patents or licenses
under them cannot be taxed, for this would actually amount to a
,u Williams v. Talladega (1912) 226 U. S. 404. Non-payment might lead
the state to prevent performance. The state may collect a license tax be-
fore the contractor serves private individuals.
33Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1928) 277 U. S. 218 (Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone and McReynolds dissented). This decision seems to stretch
the doctrine to the breaking point where the tax is reasonable and non-
discriminatory. Surely, the purveyors are not exempt from all state tax-
ation; yet all taxes would equally inevitably enter the ultimate cost to the
U.S.
- Art. 2, Sec. 8, clause 8.
"5 Grant v. Raymond (1832) 6 Pet. 218.
z6 (1928) 277 U. S. 142. It has long been admitted that patented articles
are, when made, subject to the police power of the state and may be taxed
by it. Paterson v. Kentucky (1878) 97 U. S. 501; Weber v. Virginia
(1880) 103 U. S. 344. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion seems in places to
confuse the patents and the articles made under them.
37 Cf. text and ftn. 10, above.
38 Long v. Rockwood, above.
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tax upon the patents themselves.3 9 Although the Court assumed
arguendo in Educational Films Corp. v. Ward40 that copyrights
are to be treated in the same manner as patents, there seems to
be no direct authority on their tax-exempt status. Obviously,
patents and copyrights are very closely similar and should be
treated alike.
Bonds and other securities issued by the United States are the
only other important type of federal instrumentality. In Weston
v. Charleston4l Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of
the Court that any attempt by the state to tax such securities
either by including them in the valuation of the personal prop-
erty of their owner or by taxing the interest received from them
would interfere with the Federal power to borrow money and
hence was void. This principle has been followed repeatedly
and generally recognized ever since, although the states have at
times attempted to evade its application. 42 The loss of this tax
exemption at the present time would probably not seriously
curtail the Federal Government's borrowing power, although it
would certainly increase somewhat the interest rate that would
have to be paid. This status was fixed at a time when the United
States did not enjoy its present superlative credit rating and
when Secretaries of the Treasury were frequently at their wits'
ends to raise funds. Yet the principle has continued so long in
application that it would be more fitting to change it by Congres-
sional action setting forth the terms of securities to be issued in
the future than by a judicial reversal of policy. In this case it
would probably be best to allow the interest from the bonds to
be included in the state income tax while continuing to exempt
the bonds from the general property tax which, in some states,
39 Commonwealth v. Westinghouse El. & Mfg. Co. (1892) 151 Pa. 265, 24
Atl. 1107; Edison Electric Ill. Co. v. Brooklyn (1898) 156 N. Y. 417, 51
N. E. 269.
40 (1931) 282 U. S. 379. Cf. infra, the discussion as to franchise taxes.
41 (1829) 2 Pet. 449.
42 A tax levied against a bank on its capital stock, which was to be as-
sessed at its net asset value without deducting U. S. bonds before the net
assets were reckoned, was held bad as being clearly a tax upon the bonds.
The Bank Tax Cases (1864) 2 Wall. 200. A more ingenious scheme was
that adopted by a recent Missouri statute providing for the taxation of in-
surance companies on their net worth, which was defined as being their
gross assets less their liabilities and the legal reserves they must have,
but the deduction for legal reserves was to be reduced in the proportion
their non-taxable assets bear to their taxable assets. This law was also
held bad on the theory that the assessment would be greater if tax exempt
securities were held than otherwise. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1930)
281 U. S. 313 (Stone, Brandeis, and Holmes dissented on the grounds that
allowing any deduction at all was a favor and that the proportion scheme
was reasonable as the bonds were liable for the debts due or to be due).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
like Missouri, is so high as to discourage seriously any invest-
ment in bonds if a tax is to be paid upon them.43 Even at present
a state can levy an inheritance tax on the full value of a de-
ceased person's estate, although it contains tax exempt bonds,
as this tax is theoretically on the privilege of transfer rather
than on the property transferred.44 Moreover, when the bonds
are owned by a corporation, its stockholders may be assessed
the full value of their shares, even though this value is swelled
because of the corporation's tax-exempt bonds, for the corporate
fiction acts as an insulation so as to validate the tax.45 Although
the state can generally tax the shareholder's income, even though
part of it is derived from bond interest, it cannot do so when the
Court believes the real purpose and effect of the tax is to reach
income which should be tax exempt because the statute allows
the shareholder to deduct from his return income on which the
corporation has already paid an income tax.46 It was held dur-
ing the Civil War period that "greenbacks" were mere credit in-
struments and exempt from state taxation, 47 but a statute
adopted in 1894 allows national bank notes and all forms of
notes, certificates, or coins issued by the United States and in-
tended to circulate as money to be taxed by the states as money
on hand. 48 A check or warrant issued by the United States, but
intended to be cashed at once may be taxed as money on hand,
for it is not used by the government to borrow money, as bonds
are. 49 However, a mere debt due from the United States, wheth-
er represented by a certificate of indebtedness 50 or not,51 can-
not be taxed as this would interfere with the Federal Govern-
ment's obtaining credit. A bond issued by a municipality of a
territory is to be treated as though it were issued by the United
States as far as tax exemption is concerned. 52
The most difficult part of our problem is presented when the
bonds, patents, or copyrights are held by a corporation and the
43 The present tax rate in the City of St. Louis is $2.71 per hundred and
it is notorious that many citizens evade the tax on their bonds.
44 Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115.
4' Van Allen v. The Assessors (1865) 3 Wall. 573.
46 Miller v. Milwaukee (1927) 272 U. S. 713. For further illustration of
this principle, cf. Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, infra.
4" Bank v. Supervisors (1868) 7 Wall. 26.
48 (1894) 28 Stat. 278, 31 U. S. C. sec. 425.
49 Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. San Francisco (1905) 200 U. S.
310.
50 The Bank v. The Mayor (1868) 7 Wall. 16.
51 Astoria Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Cantor (1923) 236 N. Y. 417, 141
N. E. 901.
52 Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minnesota (1913) 232 U. S.
516.
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state endeavors to impose a franchise tax upon the corporation.
At first the Supreme Court took the view that such a tax could
only be a flat sum or at most be measured by the nominal value
of the corporation's capital;53 but in Hamilton Co. v. Massa-
chusetts54 a franchise tax based upon a percentage of the excess
of the fair market value of the corporation's stock over the value
of its real estate and machinery was upheld, although the com-
pany had large holdings of United States bonds. 5 This view
has been steadily followed ever since.56 The next step was to
uphold an annual license tax based upon the dividends paid in
the preceding year. This was done in 1890 in the case of Home
Insurance Co. 'v. New York,57 although much of the income of
the company, out of which dividends were paid, was derived
from Federal bonds. The final step was to allow the franchise
tax to be measured by the net income from all sources, whether
these *sources would in themselves be taxable or not. This was
foreshadowed by the Home Insurance Co. opinion, but the cases
upholding such taxes are really based upon Flint v. Stone Tracy5 8
(upholding a United States corporate excise tax measured by
total net income, when the United States had no power to levy
an income tax). However, such a tax cannot be measured by a
percentage of the gross income of the corporation. Such a tax
is held to be a direct tax as it is not a reasonable measure of the
benefits derived from the use of the corporate form and ob-
viously is more directly a burden on tax-exempt income.5 9 In
1929 the Supreme Court threw doubt upon the whole theory
supporting the validity of excises measured by net income from
all sources by holding a Massachusetts tax, which was in the
usual form of a franchise tax and which had repeatedly been
held to be a franchise tax by the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
to be invalid. However, a careful reading of the majority
opinion in Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts ° shows that the ma-
jority reached its conclusion on grounds which did not involve a
reversal of Flint v. Stone Tracy, although they cited it as "ex-
treme." It was premised that the Supreme Court could not be
controlled in its interpretation of the real effect of a state statute
by any mere form of words or by the decisions of the state
Supreme Court. The majority then determined that the legis-
53 Bank of Commerce v. New York City (1862) 2 Bl. 620.
54 (1867) 6 Wall. 632.
z5 Inevitably the market value of the stock would in the long run reflect
these bond holdings, although it might not do so at any particular time.
50 National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts (1928) 277 U. S. 413.
57 (1890) 134 U. S. 594.
58 (1911) 220 U. S. 107.
59 Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin (1927) 275 U. S. 36.
60 (1929) 279 U. S. 620.
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lative history of this particular tax (the former law included
only income which would be taxable directly) evinced a desire to
reach the illegal end of taxing income from United States bonds
by seemingly legal means; hence, in reality this was a direct tax
and void as such. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dis-
sented because they could see no such ulterior purpose in the
law and strongly believed in the general validity of franchise
taxes measured by total net income. In 1931 a New York
Statute,61 almost identical in wording, but with a slightly dif-
ferent legislative history, was declared in Educational Films
Corp. v. Ward62 to be a franchise tax and valid even though it
included income from copyrights. Three justices who had been
with the majority in the Macallen case dissented on the ground
that the two cases could not be distinguished.6 3 The paradoxical
results possible by the application of the franchise tax doctrine
and the rigid regard for the legal as distinguished from the
economic incidence of the tax is shown by the contrasting re-
sults in Long v. Rockwood and Educational Films Corp. v. Ward.
In the former a tax including the income from royalties on
patents was invalid, even though the royalties were only a part
of the taxpayer's income. In the latter a tax measured by net
income which was wholly derived from royalties from copyrights
was upheld. Yet, on the whole it is clearly best that the state
franchise tax be graduated according to the benefits derived
from the privilege of using the corporate form and the total net
income is probably the best pragmatic measure of these benefits.
The justices of the Supreme Court seem to be divided as to
what is the proper theory on which to place the exemption of
Federal instrumentalities. The vast majority of cases are de-
cided upon a consideration of the precedents without any con-
sideration of the theory underlying these earlier decisions.
These precedents virtually all trace back to Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, Osborne v. The Bank,
and Weston v. Charleston. Marshall was untroubled by any ap-
parent necessity to set any limits to the tax-exempt status of
Federal instrumentalities. If the thing in question was a Fed-
eral instrumentality, that was enough; it was exempt. The
modern justices are not so fortunate. The functions of the Fed-
eral Government have expanded greatly, thereby creating great
masses of property and securities whose exemption means
51 Laws of N. Y. 1929, c. 385.
82 (1931) 282 U. S. 379.
6' One of the justices who was in the majority in the Macallen case was
also in the majority in the Educational Films Corp. case, while the other
two of the majority justices in the former case were no longer on the Court
when the latter was decided.
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heavier taxation against such other property as the state can
reach. The recognition that some Federal instrumentalities do
not need tax exemption to achieve their purpose and will not
receive it unless Congress expressly declares that they shall is a
step in solving this problem which was made by a unanimous
Court.6 4 Justice Stone would restate the rule on the entire
subject, making it far less sweeping in its protective scope:
Each government in order that it may administer its af-
fairs within its own sphere must be left free from undue
interference by the other. . . . Hence, the limitation upon
the taxing power of each, so far as it affects the other, must
receive a practical construction which permits both to func-
tion with a minimum of interference with each other, and
that limitation cannot be so varied and extended as seriously
to impair either the taxing power of the government impos-
ing the tax or the appropriate exercise of the functions of
the government affected by it.65
In recent dissenting opinions Justices Holmes and Brandeis
have urged that the true test is the reasonableness of the tax, as
in cases involving interstate commerce.66 It would seem that in
practice this would lead to the same result as the criterion pro-
posed by Justice Stone. These views have not yet been adopted
by the Court as such in any case involving state taxation of
Federal instrumentalities, although the quoted passage ex-
pressing Justice Stone's view is part of the opinion of the Court
in upholding a Federal income tax on an alleged state agent.
However sharp the theoretical conflict, the current trend of
the decisions does not seem to be towards an upset of what has
long been conceived to be the law on this subject. Direct taxes
on almost all Federal instrumentalities are still bad. A properly
drawn franchise tax may still be measured by net income from
all sources. The Court does seem to be more vigilant than
formerly in seeking out and prohibiting attempts to reach tax-
exempt securities by the misuse of legal forms of taxation.0 7
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
64 Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., above, ftn. 10.
65 Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 1. c. 523 and 524.
66 Especially in Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mis-
sissippi, and Long v. Rockwood, above.
67 Such zeal was clearly apparent in the Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts
and Miller v. Milwaukee cases. It may be thought to have by now some-
what abated in the light of the decision in Educational Films Corp. v. Ward.
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